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Conflict of Laws-CHOICE OF LAW-GOVERNMENTAL
INTEREST
TESTAPPLIED
TO HOLDFOREIGN
TAVERN
OWNER
LIABLEUNDER
LOCAL
LAW-Bernhard u. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313,546 P.2d
719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 159 (1976).
Harrah's Club, a well known Nevada gambling and drinking
club, regularly advertises in California. In July 1971, Fern and
Phillip Myers responded to the Club's advertisements and drove
from their California home to Harrah's Club in Nevada. Although
the Myers became obviously intoxicated while at the club, club
employees continued to serve them alcoholic beverages. The
Myers left the club and drove from Nevada into California, where
their car, driven by a highly intoxicated Fern Myers, crossed the
center line and collided head-on with motorcyclist Richard Bernhard.
Bernhard, also a California resident, brought an action
against Harrah's Club in California superior court. He alleged
that Harrah's Club had negligently furnished alcoholic beverages
to the Myers and that under California law the club was civilly
liable for injuries caused in his accident with the Myers. Harrah's
Club filed a general demurrer, claiming that Nevada law, which
denies recovery against a tavernkeeper for damages caused by his
intoxicated patrons, should govern. The trial court sustained the
demurrer. The California Supreme Court, having previously rejected the traditional torts conflict rule of lex loci delicti in favor
of the governmental interest approach, analyzed the California
and Nevada state interests and concluded that since California's
interest would be more impaired by the nonapplication of California law, California law should app1y.l

A.

The Restatement and Lex Loci Delicti

Until recently, the rule universally applied to torts conflicts
was that of lex loci delicti-the law of the place of the wrong
governed. This simple rule was embodied in the first Restatement
of Conflicts2and reflected the Restatement's overall concern with
certainty, predictability of result, and ease of administration.
1. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert.
denied, 97 S . Ct. 159 (1976). The court of appeals also applied California law, although
on different reasoning. Bernhard v. Myers, 117 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974). Interestingly, the
court in the instant case did not mention the lower appeal.
2. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS$4 377-83 (1934).

954

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

Strict application of the rule, however, often resulted in inequitable and unjust result^.^ In order to apply some law other than that
indicated by strict operation of the rule, innovative courts resorted to various subterfuges: classifying the issue as procedural
rather than s~bstantive;~
characterizing the matter as contract
rather than tort;5 resorting to r e n v ~ i or
; ~ arbitrarily relying on
public policy.'
The rule and the Restatement were generally denounced by
commentator^,^ who not only criticized the judicial gymnastics
required to avoid literal application of the rulegbut also pointed
out that a mechanical application of the rule generally ignored
the special facts of the case, the contents and purposes of the
conflicting laws, lo and the relevant state interests."
The courts, sensitive to the criticisms and aware of the inequitable results of lex loci delicti, began to abandon the rule in
favor of less rigid approaches. l2 This transition, however, has been
3. An oft-cited example is the case of Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956), which involved an accident in Arabia between
a United States citizen and a truck owned by a United States corporation. The federal
district court in New York applied New York's conflicts rule, or lex loci delicti, and
directed a verdict for defendant, since plaintiff had failed to present evidence of the
applicable Saudi Arabian law. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
OF CONFLICT
OF
4. The court was free to apply its own procedural law. RESTATEMENT
LAWS8 585 (1934); see, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 862, 264 P.2d 944, 946
(1953). But see Allen v. Nessler, 247 Minn. 230, 240-43, 76 N.W.2d 793, 799-800 (1956).
5. Since under the Restatement the court was to apply the law of the place of contracting, courts, by treating the issue as contractual rather than tortious, could sometimes
change the substantive law that should apply. See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto
Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928).
6. Renvoi is a doctrine under which the court adopts the law of a foreign jurisdiction,
including the law of conflicts of law, which in turn refers the court back to the law of its
own forum. See, e.g., University of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936).
7. See, e.g., Hudson v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 P. 374 (1927).
AND LEGAL
BASESOF THE CONFLICTOF LAWS(1942);
8. E.g., W. COOK,T H E LOGICAL
Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV.173 (1933).
9. See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV.655, 670 n.35
( 1959).
10. D. CAVERS,
THECHOICE-OF-LAW
PROCESS
9 (1965); see also Cavers, supra note 8,
a t 192.
11. Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of
L. REV. 205 (1958).
Laws, 10 STAN.
12. In the following cases, the courts have either expressly rejected the lex loci delicti
rule or have impliedly rejected it by rejecting the Restatement approach in another area:
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alas. 1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562,
447 P.2d 254 (1968);Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551,432 P.2d 727,63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967);
First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437,514 P.2d 314 (1973); Rungee v. Allied Van Lines,
92 Idaho 718,449 P.2d 378 (1968); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57,213 N.E.2d 544 (1966);
W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570,63 N.E.2d 417 (1945); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257
Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967);Jagers v.
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difficult and has led to confusion.13Although the commentators
were united in their dislike for the rule and the Restatement, they
invariably disagreed on a more satisfactory alternative. As a result, the courts have adopted a variety of approaches, drawing
support from the various modern theories as needed.14
In order to understand current torts conflicts law, one must
have some understanding of the alternatives that are presented
to a court when dealing with a conflicts question. The following
section gives a brief description of the more prominent modern
theories. Inasmuch as the suggestions of most commentators
embrace a general approach to all areas of conflicts law, the following discussion will first describe the overall approach and then
comment more specifically on its tort application.

B. Modern Alternatives to the Restatement
1. The Restatement (Second)
The most widely adopted alternative approach15is that conRoyal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973); Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me.
1970); In re Air Crash Disaster, 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975); Schneider v. Nichols,
280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968);
Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Hanley v. Tribune Publishing Co., 527
F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1975) (Nevada); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351,222 A.2d 205 (1966); Mellk
v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972);
Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405, cert. denied,
403 U.S. 931 (1971); Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974); Casey v. Manson
Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416
Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, petition for
cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1968); Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Carden, 127 Vt. 229,245 A.2d
891 (1968) (contract case); Potlatch No. 1 Fed. Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wash. 2d
806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969) (contract case); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408
(1965). The lex loci delicti rule has been followed in some recent cases, e.g., Landers v.
Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Friday v. Smoot, 58 Del. 488, 211 A.2d 594
(1965).
13. For a review of the development of the law in various states, see Leflar, The
"New" Choice of Law, 21 AM. U.L. REV.457 (1972).
14. Leflar's analysis of the Wisconsin cases illustrates the pattern: Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931) (lex loci delicti); Haumschild v. Continental Cas.
Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (characterization of the doctrine of intrafamily
immunity as a family law problem governed by the law of the domicile); Wilcox v. Wilcox,
26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965) (combination of "most significant relationship,"
"center of gravity,'' and "governmental interest" theories); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d
578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967) (adoption of Leflar's "choice-influencing considerations").
Leflar, supra note 13, a t 465-67. For a review and comparison of the different approaches,
L. REV.927
see von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL
(1975); Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-LawMethodologies:
The Case for Eclecticism, 40 Mo. L. REV. 407 (1975).
(SECOND)
OF C O N ~ I C
OFT LAWS,app. $ $ 145-85
15. See cases cited in RESTATEMENT
(1971).
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tained in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. The most
significant aspect of this alternative is that it greatly increases
the range of policies to be considered when dealing with a conflicts issue. Whereas the first Restatement was overly preoccupied with ease of administration, certainty, and uniformity, section 6 of the Restatement (Second) adds other broad considerations, such as the needs of the interstate and international systems, the relevant policies of the forum and other interested
states, and the protection of the parties' justified expectations.18
Based upon these broad policies, more specific rules are formulated in each area of the law. The rule to be applied in torts
conflicts issues is that the "rights and liabilities of the parties
. . . are determined by the . . . law of the state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence."17 The Restatement (Second) also offers rules that
apply to specific torts, e.g., tort actions based on injuries to person, land or other tangibles usually are to be governed by the law
of the state where the injury occurred.18
The Restatement (Second) is the most versatile of the various methods of conflict resolution. For example, a court dealing
with a torts conflicts issue is free to base its decision upon the
broad policies outlined in section 6, the narrow "most significant
relationship" test, or even narrower rules that deal with specific
torts. This flexibility has been both applaudedl@and criticized.
The most common criticism of the broad approach is that it affords "no real basis for decision in the hard cases because it does
not identify the considerations which control the flexibility that
16. Restatement (Second) 8 6 suggests that, absent statutory authority, a court
should consider the following factors as being relevant to the choice of applicable law:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests
of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
17. Id. 9 145. In making this determination, the following contacts are to be taken
into account: the place where the injury occurred; the place where the conduct occurred;
the domicile of the parties; and the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered. Id.
18. Id. $9 146-49, 151-52, 154-55.
19. "[Tlhe Restatement (Second) is the most workable and useful single tool . . .
currently available to the bench and the bar. It is comprehensive, flexible, and eclectic."
Westbrook, supra note 14, a t 463.
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it allows . . . ."m The more specific torts rules have been condemned as throwbacks to the original Restatement's preoccupation with the place of the injury as the determining factor.21

2. Leflar and the choice-influencing considerations
The broad policies outlined in Restatement (Second) section
6 provide the basis for the "choice-influencing considerations"
proposed by Professor Robert Leflar.22Leflar's thesis is that
courts can use the actual policies as a "practical (though not a
mechanical) test of the rightness of choice-of-law rules and decis i o n ~ . He
" ~ ~maintains, however, that the many policies involvedU
must be reduced to a manageable number, with a minimum of
overlap. Accordingly, he has summarized the policies relevant to
conflicts laws into five "choice-influencing consideration^":^^ (1)
predictability of results,26(2) maintenance of interstate and international order,27(3) simplification of the judicial task," (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interest^,^^ and (5) appli20. R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN
CONFLICTS
LAW 8 96 a t 222 (1968).
21. Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts,
Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 28 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB.700,704 (1963);
D. CAVERS,
supra note 10, a t 72.
22. Leflcr, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV.267
( 1966).
23. Id. a t 281.
24. The Restatement (Second) lists seven policies to be considered-see note 16
supra. Professor Yntema has identified 17 policies which he says are relevant in the choiceof-law process. Yntema, The Objective of Private International Law, 35 CAN.B. REV.721,
734-35 (1957).
supra note 20,
25. The choice-influencing considerations are discussed in R. LEFLAR,
at § § 101-11; Leflar, supra note 22; Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations, 54 CALIF.L. REV.1584 (1966) (gives hypothetical applications).
26. This consideration embraces the policy encouraging uniformity of result and the
policy that the parties to a transaction should be able to predict beforehand the legal
consequences of their actions. See Leflar, supra note 22, a t 282-83.
27. The problems arising from the unique system of federalism within the United
States, as well as the conflicts that arise between nations, are weighed in this factor. It
includes a consideration of the limitations upon state action that are imposed by the
federal constitution and also recognizes the possible interests of states other than the
forum in having their law applied. See id. a t 285-87.
28. Although this is classified as a minor consideration, Leflar maintains that complex rules that are difficult to administer delay decisions and lead to overcrowded dockets.
Therefore, other considerations being equal, a court should give preference to the law that
is simplest to apply. However, this does not justify an automatic preference for forum law,
nor should mechanical rules such as lex loci delicti be applied, since both ignore other
important policies. See id. a t 288-90.
29. This consideration recognizes the interest of the forum state in advancing its own
policies when proper. This is no justification for unreasoned preference of forum law, and
the burden is placed on the court to identify the pertinent policies by "thoughtful and
intelligent analysis of the legal materials in the light of current socio-economic, cultural,
and political attitudes in the community." Id. a t 290-95.

958

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

cation of the better rule of law.30
Criticism of Leflar's approach has generally been directed
toward the "better rule of law" consideration and has pointed out
that if a court applies a foreign law as better than its own, it is
either usurping the role of its own state legislature or avoiding its
responsibility to overrule and update its own law. On the other
hand, application of a forum's own law as "better" has been
criticized as presumptuous and offensive to the other state.31
Despite these criticisms, several jurisdictions have adopted
Leflar's approachS2and have relied expressly on the "better rule
of law" consideration in their decisions. In torts cases, the decisions have been based primarily on the courts' analyses of the
"better rule of law" and "governmental interest" considerations,
while the other three factors have been dismissed as irrelevant or
unimportant .33
3.

Cavers and principled preferences

Professor David Cavers has voiced his concern that formulas
such as Leflar's are too complex and of no precedential value.
Accordingly, he has advocated the development of what he terms
"principles of preferen~e,"~~
which are in essence rules that would
apply to all cases having the same general fact pattern.
Generally, the principles of preference apply the law imposing the higher standard of conduct, providing it is not unjust to
the defendant. For example, Principle 1 deals with the situation
where the law of the state of injury provides a higher standard of
conduct than the law of the state where the defendant acted or
has his home, and mandates the application of the law of the
state of injury. Similarly, if the law of the state where the defendant acted imposes a higher standard of conduct than the law of
the state of injury, Principle 3 indicates that the higher standard
should apply, as long as the injury was foreseeable to the defen30. Although his inclusion of this consideration has been highly criticized, Leflar
defends it on the ground that courts do consider it. Its inclusion provides a means for
courts to reject "anachronistic laws still hanging on" in their own or other states without
having to "cover up" their choice with other superficial reasons. See id. a t 295-304.
31. Westbrook, supra note 14, a t 461-62.
32. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Clark v. Clark, 107
N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
33. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 170, 203 N.W.2d 408, 416-17 (1973); Clark v.
Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 355-56, 222 A.2d 205, 209 (1966); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578,
599-602, 151 N.W.2d 664, 674-75 (1967).
34. See D. CAVERS,supra note 10, a t 121-22 & n.8.
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dant. However, in the instance where the law of the state of injury
and defendant's conduct imposes a lower standard than that of
the home state of the plaintiff, Principle 2 indicates that the
defendant's expectations should be protected and the law of the
state of action and injury, even though imposing a lower standard
of conduct, should apply.35
Although none of Cavers' principles have been expressly
adopted by any jurisdiction, they have been used as forceful arguments when a p p l i ~ a b l e . ~ ~
4. Ehrenzweig and lex fori

In contrast to Leflar and Cavers, both of whom criticize any
overt preference for forum law,37Professor Albert Ehrenzweig has
attempted to show by logical argument and historical analysis
that the forum should begin with the presumption that it will
apply its own law (lex fori), except in certain situations where
rules have developed that dictate the application of foreign law.38
Examples of these rules include a "rule of validation" in reference
to contracts, trusts, and wills, which generally seeks to uphold the
validity of such agreement^,^^ and the situs rules that generally
govern in property cases.40
In torts, Ehrenzweig advocates the general application of lex
fori, except where either party would be dealt with unfairly. Ehrenzweig divides these latter cases into two categories: those in
which the primary purpose of the law is the censure and admoni, ~ ~those in which the law seeks primartion of the ~ r o n g d o e rand
ily to compensate for harm inflicted by unavoidable accidents
As to the admonitory torts, Ehrenzweig
(enterprise liabilit~).'~
35. Id. at 139-66.
36. The appellate court in the instant case relied upon Principle 1 as a partial justification for its decision to apply California law. Bernhard v. Myers, 117 Cal. Rptr. 351, 356
(1974).
37. D. CAVERS,
supra note 10, a t 120; Cavers, Some of Ehrenzweig's Choice-of-Law
Generalizations, 18 OKLA.L. REV.357, 359-60 (1965); Leflar, supra note 22, at 291.
CASESAND
38. For a summary of Ehrenzweig's views, see W. REESE& M. ROSENBERG,
MATERIALS
ON CONFLICT
OF LAWS
525-26 (6th ed. 1971).
A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS$ 4 175-84
39. Id. See also A. EHRENZWEIG,
(1962).
40. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH.L. REV.
supra note 39, § § 232-34.
637, 643 (1960); A. EHRENZWEIG,
41. See Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Laui and
Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 MINN.L. REV.1, 5 (1951).
42. See id.; Ehrenzweig, Vicarious Liability in the Conflict of Laws-Touard a
Theory of Enterprise Liability under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": 111, 69 YALEL.J.
978 ( 1960).
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would apply the law of the state of conduct.43In cases of enterprise liability, Ehrenzweig would apply any law that is reasonably
"foreseeable and insurable" by the defendant.44In instances in
which a defendant finds himself in a state whose laws were not
foreseeable, Ehrenzweig would recommend dismissal under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 45 Thus, the plaintiff must
choose a forum whose laws were foreseeable and calculable by the
defendant.
Although his views are often ~ited,~"hrenzweig's lex fori
doctrine has not been explicitly adopted by any juri~diction.~'
Ehrenzweig maintains, however, that courts have implicitly applied these principles," except where the judges were not imaginative enough to escape from black letter rules such as those of
the Restatement.
5. Currie and governmental interest analysis

The instant case applied the approach advocated by the late
Professor Brainerd Currie. Like Ehrenzweig's theory, Professor
Currie's "governmental interest" theory expresses a strong preference for the application of forum law," a position based on Currie's firmly held belief that the forum state with an interest in the
case should (in most instances) apply its own law.50
43. Ehrenzweig, supra note 41, a t 5-6.
44. Ehrenzweig, supra note 42, a t 978.
45. See Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a Theory of
Enterprise Liability under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": 11, 69 YALEL. J . 794, 801
(1960); Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": I, 69 YALEL.J . 595, 603 (1960).
46. E.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y .2d 473,484,191 N .E.2d 279,285, 240 N .Y.S.2d
743, 751 (1963); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155,166-68, 203 N.W.2d 408,414-15 (1973).
Often Ehrenzweig would disagree with either the method used to resolve the case or with
the result. One author has summarized the situation in the following manner: "One way
to sum up the citation situation would be by saying that the courts have taken about the
same liberties in citing Ehrenzweig's writing that he sometimes takes in citing their
cases." Leflar, Ehrenzweig and the Courts, 18 OKLA.L. REV. 366, 371 (1965) (containing
a good summary of Ehrenzweig's influence on the judiciary).
47. Leflar has examined eight recent conflicts cases and concluded that none of them
have adopted Ehrenzweig's approach, although he is sometimes cited. Leflar, supra note
46, a t 369-71.
48. Ehrenzweig, supra note 40, a t 643-44. At least one other commentator, Professor
Currie, does not agree with Ehrenzweig's interpretation of the cases. See Currie,
Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frauds: An Inquiry into the "Rule of Validation", 18 OKLA.
L. REV.243 (1965).
L.J.
49. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE
171, 177-78 (1959).
5G. Currie has stated that:
[Wlhen the court, in a true conflict situation, holds the foreign law applicable,
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The governmental interest method involves essentially a
four-step pro~ess~~-policy
analysis, false conflict analysis, conflict avoidance, and forum law application. The policy analysis
step requires the court to determine and analyze the policies underlying the conflicting laws of the forum and the foreign state."
The most common criticism of the policy analysis step emphasizes the difficulty of ascertaining the policies underlying the
laws, particularly when the forum court examines foreign law. A
related criticism is that the forum court may not be capable of
determining the strength of the policy held by the other state."
Under the false conflict step, the court determines whether
or not either state has an interest in applying its policy. If only
one state has such an interest, the court simply applies the law
of the interested ~tate.~"his portion of the approach has been
termed the "clearest contribution of governmental-interest analy ~ i s . "The
~ ~ correct application of this principle disposes of many
apparent conflicts, and it has found wide acceptance among
courts and commentator^.^^ However, some commentators have
expressed concern that a court, by failing to identify the state
policies and interests involved, will erroneously conclude that
there is no conflict.57
The conflict avoidance step requires the court to take a closer
look at an apparent conflict. If a moderate or restrained interpretation of the policy or interest of one of the states will avoid a
conflict, the other state's law should be applied.58Currie cites as
an example of this step the California case of Bernkrant v.
it is assuming a great deal: it is holding the policy, or interest, of its own state
inferior and preferring the policy or interest of the foreign state. . . . [Tlhe
task is not one to be performed by a court. . . . This is a job for a legislative
committee . . . .
Id. a t 176-77.
supra note 38,
51. For a summary of Currie's views, see W. REESE& M. ROSENBERG,
a t 523-24.
52. Id. at 523.
53. For these and other criticisms, see Reese, Recent Developments in Torts Choiceof-Law Thinking in the United States, 8 COLUM.
J . TRANSNAT'L
L. 181,186-87 (1969); Hill,
Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U . CHI.
L. REV.463 (1960).
supra note 38, at 523.
54. W. REESE& M. ROSENBERG,
PROB.754, 756 (1963).
55. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 L. & CONTEMP.
S U P M note 10, at 89;
56. See, e.g., Traynor, supra note 9, at 667-81; D. CAVERS,
Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (uses
false conflict concept even though applying most significant relationship test).
57. E.g., Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California-a Restatement, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REV.719, 743 (1974).
58. W. REESE& M. SENB BERG, supra note 38, at 523.
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Fowler,59in which the court declined to apply the California Statute of Frauds, which would have invalidated a claim against an
estate based on an oral contract. Nevada, the place of contracting
and domicile of the plaintiffs, had no such law. In that case,
Justice Traynor correctly reasoned (according to Currie) that a
broad application of California's statute was unnecessary to effectuate the legislative policy and, by a moderate and restrained
interpretation of the California statute, avoided conflict with
Nevada law and
Under the fourth step, if the court is unable to avoid a conflict between the legitimate interests of the two states, it should
apply its own forum's law." Currie's conclusion that in a true
conflict the court should apply the law of the forum has drawn
heavy criticism from most commentator^.^^ Even some who basically agree with the rest of his approach have offered their own
suggestions on how to deal with this situation.
One such solution has been proposed by Professor William
Baxteqs3who suggests that a court that faces a true conflict
should examine each state's interest and determine to what extent the purpose underlying a rule will be furthered by the application or impaired by the nonapplication of the rule. The court
should apply the law of the state whose policy would be most
impaired by the nonapplication of the law-a concept Baxter
labels the "comparative impairment" principle. Baxter admits
that in some cases the contending interests will appear to be in
balance, whereupon he says that "[tlhe judge decides on the
basis of some marginal factor and justifies his decision as best he
can in his opinion."64
Professor Harold H o r o w i t ~while
, ~ ~ accepting Baxter's comparative impairment analysis, has suggested additional factors
the court should consider when faced with a difficult decision. He
recommends that the court consider "applicable multistate polic i e ~ such
" ~ ~ as the "rule of validation" proposed by Ehrenz~eig,~'
59. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
60. Currie, supra note 55, at 757-58.
61. W. REESE& M. SENB BERG, supra note 38, at 524.
supra note 20, at 224-25; Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal
62. E.g., R. LEFLAR,
System, 16 STAN. L. REV.1, 19 (1963); Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and
"True Rules", 49 CALIF.L. REV.240, 246-48 (1961).
63. Baxter, supra note 62.
64. Id. at 9.
65. Horowitz, supra note 57.
66. Id. at 758-76.
67. Id. at 759. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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and other policies which facilitate and uphold interstate transactions. In addition, he suggests that the court examine the
"relevant interests of the parties,"" thus bringing into consideration the parties' expectations and attempting to avoid unfair surprise.
In summary, the application of traditional interest analysis
as outlined by Professor Currie would place a conflicts case into
one of the following categorie~:~~
(1)a false conflict case-only one
state has an interest and its law will be applied;" (2) an avoidable
conflict case-both states have legitimate interests, but the conflict is resolved by a moderate definition of the policy or interest
of one state or the other; and (3) an unavoidable conflict
case-the legitimate interests of the states cannot be reconciled,
and therefore forum law should be applied.
The comparative impairment refinement of Professor Currie's approach would eliminate the third category and expand the
second category to include all cases except those in which the
policies and interests are balanced, whereupon other factors
would be considered in making the decision.
Several courts have issued opinions which refer to "governmental intere~t."~'
As indicated earlier, both the Restatement
(Second) and Leflar's choice-influencing considerations include
analysis of governmental interests as a factor to be considered
in resolving a conflicts issue. Therefore, a court that speaks of
governmental interest may not necessarily belong to Currie's
camp. California, however, has adopted the Currie approach.
The following section briefly traces the development of California
conflicts law up to the instant case.
-

68. Horowitz, supra note 57, a t 776-79. It is possible that Professor Currie's
"moderate and restrained interpretation" step would encompass the above theories-the
court in the instant case apparently equated "comparative impairmentwwith "a moderate
and restrained interpretation." See 16 Cal. 3d a t 319-23,546 P.2d a t 722-26, 128 Cal. Rptr.
a t 218-22.
However, few would agree with Currie that forum law should be applied as a last
resort. Thus Currie's approach is sometimes termed "traditional" governmental interest,
when compared to the other solutions which have been suggested. See Sedler,
Symposium-Conflict of Laws Round Table: The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 a x .
L. REV.224 (1971).
69. See Currie, supra note 55, at 763.
70. Other authors have identified additional false conflicts such as the instances in
which the laws of both states are the same, or would produce the same result. See Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF.
L. REV.74 (1967).
71. See, e.g., cases cited in note 32 supra.
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C. Previous California Conflicts Cases
Prior to 1967, lex loci delicti was applied in C a l i f ~ r n i aCali.~~
fornia's break from the rule was foreshadowed in the 1963 case of
Bernkrant v. Fowler, 73 in which the California Supreme Court
relied on an analysis of the state interests involved and the expectations of the parties. Even though the court did not employ the
governmental interest approach, Currie applauded Bernkrant
as a model case wherein conflict was avoided by a moderate and
restrained interpretation of California Law.74
People v. One 1953 Ford Vi~toria,'~
which could also be classified as a conflict avoidance case, involved the application of a
California statute that required that the mortgagee of an automobile forfeit his interest if the car were later used to transport
narcotics, unless he had made an investigation of the character
of the purchaser at the time of sale. The sale in question was
made in Texas, where there was no such requirement. The court
in the instant case cited People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria as an
example of a successful application of the comparative impairment prin~iple.'~
As interpreted by the Bernhard court, the decision not to apply the California statute was the result of a
conclusion that California's interest in controlling the transportation of narcotics would be less impaired by the nonapplication of
the California law than would Texas' interest in protecting valid
security interests if Texas law were not applied. Currie described
the case as a "fine illustration of how a court may, by defining
local interests with moderation and restraint, avoid conflict with
the interests of another state."''
Although foreshadowed by these cases, California did not
expressly reject the lex loci delicti rule until the 1967 case of Reich
v. P u r ~ e l lReich
. ~ ~ involved an automobile accident in Missouri
between the Reichs, Ohio residents en route to California, and
Purcell, a California resident. The accident caused the death of
Mrs. Reich and her son. The laws of Missouri limited damages
72. E.g., Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932). The rule was rejected
in Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). See text
accompanying notes 78-84 infra.
73. 55 Cal. 2d 588,360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961); see text accompanying note
59 supra.
74. Currie, supra note 55, at 757.
75. 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
76. 16 Cal. 3d at 321-22, 546 P.2d at 724, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
77. Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN.L. REV.719,749 (1961).
78. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
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to $25,000, while California and Ohio had no limitation. In the
resultant action by Mr. Reich, the trial court entered a judgment
for $25,000. The California Supreme Court reversed, first rejecting the place-of-the-wrongruleT9and then proceeding to analyze
the case from the standpoint of governmental interest.
Following the formula espoused by Professor Currie, the
court first identified the "involved statesV8Oas California (forum
state and domicile of the defendant), Ohio (domicile of the plaintiffs and decedents at the time of the accident), and Missouri
(place of the injury). Each state's law was ascertained, and the
court examined the interest of the three states in the case. As for
its own law, the court concluded that since California had no
limitations on damages, it had no interest in protecting the defendant. The fact that the plaintiffs had moved to California following the accident was considered irrelevant, and California was
classified as a disinterested forum. Missouri was said to have the
predominant interest as to the regulation of conduct within its
borders, but the court classified the limitation on damages not as
an issue of conduct, but as an issue of compensation. The court
explained that Missouri would have no substantial interest in
applying its laws governing compensation since none of the parties resided there. Having concluded that neither California nor
Missouri had an interest in the case, the court noted that the
defendant himself could not complain "when compensatory damages are assessed in accordance with the law of his d ~ m i c i l e , " ~ ~
and applied Ohio law. Although the court did not so identify the
case as such in the opinion, it was later classified as a false confli~t.~~
Hurtado v. Superior Court,83also a false conflict case, involved a wrongful death action brought by the survivors of a
Mexican citizen killed in an accident in California. The defendant was a California resident. The court rejected the application
of Mexico's limitation on damages, finding that the underlying
policy of protecting defendants from the imposition of excessive
financial burdens was inapplicable since the defendant was a
California resident. The court found an interest in applying its
own law, reasoning that the purpose of the law, which imposed
79. Id. at 555, 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 556, 432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
82. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313,319, 546 P.2d 719, 722, 128 Cal. Rptr.
215, 218, cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 159 (1976).
83. 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
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no limitations on recovery for wrongful death, was to strengthen
the deterrent aspect of the law creating an action for wrongful
death. California was found to have a definite interest in deterring harmful conduct within its borderd4
Reich and Hurtado established a pattern for the resolution
of conflicts of law problems utilizing the governmental interest
approach: (1) identify the involved states, (2) ascertain their
respective laws, (3) identify the policies and state interests underlying the laws, and (4) determine if each state has an interest in
applying its own law. This analysis was carried no further, however, since in both cases the court found that only one state had
an interest in applying its law. Thus, neither Reich nor Hurtado
gave any concrete indication as to how the court would deal with
a true conflict.
In the instant case, the California Supreme Court followed
the pattern established in Reich and Hurtado, first identifying
the "involved states" as Nevada and California and then analyzing their respective laws and underlying policies. The court noted
, ~ ~
that, in the case of Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, I ~ C .the
Nevada Supreme Court had refused to impose civil liability
upon tavern owners, the stated policy being that to do so would
"subject the tavern owner to ruinous exposure every time he
poured a drink and would multiply litigation endlessly [needlessly] in a claims[s]-conscious society. California, however,
seeking to enforce a policy that would "[protect] members- of
the general public from injuries . . . resulting from the excessive
use of intoxicating liquor,"" had judicially imposed civil liability
on a tavern owner in the 1971 decision of Vesely v. Sager? The
court concluded that both states had an interest in the case and
that it was confronted with a true conflict rather than a false
conflict as in the previous cases of Reich and hurt ad^.^^
Faced with a true conflict, the court, under traditional inter-

--

-

84. Id. at 583-84, 522 P.2d at 672, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
85. 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969).
86. 16 Cal. 3d at 318,546 P.2d at 722,128 Cal. Rptr. at 218 (quoting Hamm v. Carson
City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 101, 450 P.2d 358, 359 (1969)).
87. 16 Cal. 3d at 318,546 P.2d at 722,128 Cal. Rptr. at 218 (quoting Vesely v. Sager,
5 Cal. 3d 153, 165, 486 P.2d 151, 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 631 (1971)).
88. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
89. 16 Cal. 3d at 319, 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218.

9531

CASE NOTES

967

est analysis, could have simply applied the law of the forum.go
However, the court apparently chose to treat this as an avoidable
conflictg1and attempted to resolve the issue through a moderate
and restrained interpretation of the applicable laws. To implement this process the court adopted the "comparative impairment" concept advocated by Professor Baxterg2and attempted to
determine "which state's interest would be more impaired if its
policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state."g3
The court had identified Nevada's policy as being designed
to limit the liability of its tavern owners and the California policy
as being to protect its citizens from injury resulting from the use
of intoxicating liquor. Analyzing these policies in light of the facts
presented by the case, the court reasoned that the defendant, by
advertising and soliciting business in California, had "put itself
a t the heart of California's regulatory i n t e r e ~ t . "Therefore,
~~
its
activities fell within the scope of the California law and California's interest would be substantially impaired if California law
were not applied.
The court minimized the impact of the decision on Nevada's
interest, stating that since Nevada already subjects its tavern
owners to criminal liability, the decision would not impose an
entirely new duty upon the tavern owners to distinguish between
California residents and other patrons but would simply increase
their economic exposure to include a foreseeable and coverable
business expense. Further, since liability would extend only to
those tavern owners who advertise in California, Nevada's policy
would not be significantly impaired? The court concluded that
on balance the California policy would be more impaired if California law were not applied and, therefore, reversed the trial
court's decision to sustain the demurrer.

The validity of the court's use of the governmental interest
approach depends largely upon the accuracy of its identification
of the interests and policies underlying the conflicting state laws.
The case note will analyze the court's identification of the various
state interests and policies, discuss the application of the compar90. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
91. Avoidable conflicts are discussed in the text accompanying note 70 supra.
92. Comparative impairment is discussed in the text accompanying note 63 supra.
93. 16 Cal. 3d at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
94. Id, at 322, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
95. Id. at 323, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
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ative impairment test after fully identifying the state interests,
and review the alternatives available to a court when no decision
can be reached through state interest analysis.

A. Identifying the Underlying State Interests
The court identified the California policy as protecting the
public from injuries resulting from the excessive use of liquor.g6
This policy is furthered by imposing criminal and civil liability,
both of which seek to deter tavern owners from selling alcoholic
beverages to obviously intoxicated persons who are likely to cause
injury in California. The court specifically identified this policy
of prevention and labeled it a "regulatory intere~t."~'
Prevention of injury, however, is not the only interest underlying California's policy. Once an injury has occurred, the state
has an interest in compensating the injured. Although the court
did not mention this compensatory interest, the imposition of
civil liability appears to have a compensatory as well as a regulatory function, since it allows third parties to look to the tavern
owners for recovery for injuries sustained in accidents with intoxicated tavern patrons.
Although the court initially identified Nevada's policy as
protection of Nevada's tavern owners from unrestricted civil liab i l i t ~ the
, ~ ~court also referred several times to a supposed Nevada statute imposing criminal liability? The court apparently
assumed that although Nevada had not imposed civil liability, it
had a regulatory interest in preventing tavern owners from serving liquor to already intoxicated patrons.
The criminal statute, however, had been repealed in 1973.1°0
Id. at 318, 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
Id. at 322, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
Id. at 318, 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
Id. at 322-23, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. a t 221:
Although the State of Nevada does not impose such civil liability on its
tavern keepers, nevertheless they are subject to criminal penalties under a statute making it unlawful to sell or give intoxicating liquor to any person who is
drunk or known to be an habitual drunkard. (See Nev. Rev. Stats. 202.100

96.
97.
98.
99.

. . . .)

....

Since the act of selling alcoholic beverages to obviously intoxicated persons
is already proscribed in Nevada, the application of California's rule of civil
liability would not impose an entirely new duty requiring the ability to distinguish between California residents and other patrons.
100. 1973 Nev. Stats. 1059. The statute in effect when Hamm u. Carson City Nugget,
Inc. was decided was NEV.REX.STAT.5 202.100 (repealed 1973).
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This legislative action,lol combined with the Nevada Supreme
Court's decision in H a m m v. Carson City Nuggett, Inc.lo2not to
impose civil liability on a tavern owner, indicates that, contrary
to the court's supposition, Nevada has a strong policy against
regulating its tavern owners in this area.
Although a policy of nonregulation seems somewhat unusual
a t first glance, upon examination it .is not irrational. Nevada's
economy is based in large part upon its gambling and entertainment industries, both of which involve high-volume sales of alcoholic beverages. Thus it would seem that Nevada's policy is most
likely designed to protect its economic interests in these industries.
In addition to the probable economic interest, it would seem
that Nevada has a special interest in being free from regulation
by other states. Since states are generally empowered to establish
the rights and duties of their citizens in those areas that are free
from federal regulation, it might be said that all states have an
interest in being free from the regulation of other states. This
interest would be particularly strong if, as in the instant case, it
could be said that a state has determined that it will not regulate
an activity that is normally regulated.lo3

B. Reapplication of the Comparative Impairment Test
Having identified the policies and, to a limited extent, the
underlying motivational interests, the court attempted to resolve
the conflict by determining which state's interest would be most
impaired if its law were not applied. The court's decision to apply
California law is not unacceptable if one agrees that the court
correctly identified the underlying policies and interests.lo4How101. "A subsequent change in legislation can, although it does not necessarily do so,
define the strength of a policy at the time a transaction took place." A. VON MEHREN&
D. TRAUTMAN,
THELAWOF MULTISTATE
PROBLEMS
376 (1965).
102. 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969).
103. It might be said in light of the repeal of the criminal statute that Nevada has
extended a privilege to protect the tavern owners from liability that would ordinarily be
imposed. Comment a to § 163 of Restatement (Second) suggests that if the state of
conduct has established a privilege protecting certain behavior that is normally tortious
in the state of injury, a court should respect that privilege and apply the law of the state
of conduct if the policy underlying the rule of nonliability is a strong one.
104. If Nevada's criminal statute were still in effect, it could be assumed that both
Nevada and California would have an interest in preventing injuries and that the imposition of civil liability by California is simply strengthening a preexisting Nevada policy.
Although Nevada would still have an interest in being free from out-of-state regulation,
it seems less offensive to impose California law when Nevada's policy differs only in degree
and not in'substance from California's.
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ever, as indicated in the previous section, the court made an
incorrect assumption as to Nevada law and thus did not fully
consider Nevada's interests in the case; also, the court did not
discuss California's compensatory interest. This section will analyze the application of comparative impairment as if the court
had fully and correctly identified the state interests involved.
I.

The possible impairment of California's interests

The court correctly stated that California has an interest in
preventing the service of liquor to intoxicated customers whenever it will produce harmful effects in California. It is less clear
that California is justified in attempting to protect this interest
by imposing regulations upon conduct occurring out of state.
The California Supreme Court previously stated in Reich v.
Purcell that the foreign state within which injury occurred was
"concerned with conduct within her borders and as to such conduct she has the predominant interest of the states involved."105
Likewise, in Hurtado v. Superior Court, the court justified the
application of California law on the ground that California had
an interest in deterring harmful conduct within its borders.lOWn
the basis of the court's previous statements, it would appear that
i t would respect Nevada's predominate interest in regulating or
refusing to regulate such conduct within its borders.lo7However,
the fact that a defendant's conduct in another state will possibly
cause harmful effects in California seems to place him within the
ambit of California's interest in prevention of injury.lo8 Thus,
105. 67 Cal. 2d at 556, 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. a t 34.
106. 11 Cal. 3d at 584, 522 P.2d at 672, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
107. Id. Compare id. with Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 483, 191 N.E.2d 279,
284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 (1963):
It is hardly necessary to say that Ontario's interest is quite different from
what it would have been had the issue related to the manner in which the
defendant had been driving his car a t the time of the accident. Where the
defendant's exercise of due care in the operation of his automobile is in issue,
the jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred will usually
have a predominant, if not exclusive concern.
108. The United States Supreme Court has stated that:
A person who sets in motion in one State the means by which injury is inflicted
in another may, consistently with the due process clause, be made liable for that
injury whether the means employed be a responsible agent or an irresponsible
instrument. The cases are many in which a person acting outside the State may
be held responsible according to the law of the State for injurious consequences
within it.
Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258-59 (1932). But see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U S . 809,
824 (1975) ("A State does not acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of
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even though it is somewhat inconsistent with the court's prior
statements, it seems that the court is justified in its conclusion
in the instant case that this prevention interest would be impaired by the nonapplication of California law.
The extent to which California's compensatory interest
would be impaired by the application of Nevada law is less clear.
If California law is not applied, the plaintiff cannot recover from
the tavern owner and will be forced to recover from the California
driver. Since there is no policy allowing the plaintiff double recovery for his injuries, the compensatory interest will be impaired
only to the extent that the plaintiffs injuries exceed his recovery
from the driver. Thus the effect on California's compensatory
interest is uncertain, and may vary greatly from case to case, a
conclusion that may explain why the court did not discuss this
aspect of California's law.

The possible impairment of Nevada's interests
The impairment to Nevada's economic interest is apparent,
since part of the tavern owners' revenues will be used to pay for
either California judgments or liability insurance, thus decreasing the funds available in Nevada for taxes, investment, and
salaries. It is also conceivable that the imposition of liability
would cause tavern owners to avoid further solicitation in California, thus actually decreasing revenues and economic growth. This
reduction would probably occur, however, only if the cost of the
judgments or liability insurance exceeded the profits derived
from sales to California customers, a development that seems
unlikely.
The impairment to Nevada's interest is limited somewhat by
the fact that only those tavern owners who advertise in California
will be subject to liability. The risk of economic impairment is
increased, however, by the fact that plaintiffs in this particular
tort can choose defendants. This presents the possibility that the
tavern owner will often be the sole defendant, the plaintiff having
elected to bypass the drunken driver. The application of California law will thus have the occasional effect of substituting a Nevada defendant for a California defendant, shifting the entire
economic loss from California to Nevada.
A more serious impairment to Nevada's interest arises from
2.

another State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected
when they travel to that State.").

972

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

the imposition of regulation by California in an area wherein
Nevada has a strong policy against regulation. Nevada, exercising
its sovereign right to determine the rights and duties of its citizens, has decided that its tavern owners have no duty to avoid
selling liquor to already intoxicated patrons. The application of
California law requires that the tavern owners assume a new duty
of not only refusing to serve alcohol to already inebriated Californians, but also first identifying the California customers, a task
that may be difficult and out of place in the setting in which the
tort normally occurs. The imposition of a new standard of conduct is a more substantial imposition upon Nevada's sovereign
rights than simply extending civil liability to enforce an already
existing duty (which was what the Bernhard court thought it was
doing) or removing the dollar limitations on recovery (as in Reich
and Hurtado).
3.

Comparative impairment

Having examined in detail the impact of the nonapplication
of either state's law upon the respective state interests involved,
it appears that the resolution of the issue in the instant case on
the basis of comparative impairment is very difficult. The California policy of regulation is in direct conflict with Nevada's policy of nonregulation, the advancement of either resulting in a
corresponding detriment to the other. Further, without additional
information, it is difficult to compare the economic impairment
to Nevada with the possible impairment to California's compensatory policy. In short, an analysis of the state interests using
comparative impairment is inconclusive as to which law should
be applied.
It appears that had the court identified all the relevant state
policies and interests, it would have recognized that it faced an
unavoidable rather than an avoidable conflict. Traditional governmental interest required that the court apply the law of the
forum when faced with an unavoidable conflict;loghowever, this
is only one of the possible solutions. The following section presents a brief analysis of this and other alternatives that might be
adopted to resolve an unavoidable conflict.

C. Possible Solutions to a n Unavoidable Conflict
1. Apply forum law
Application of forum law is the traditional solution recom109. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
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mended by Professor Currie. It has the advantage of being simple
in application and also insures that the forum's interests will
always be protected. In some cases, however, application of forum
law will be grossly unfair to the defendant, since he will not have
foreseen its application. Furthermore, most commentators believe that the courts should employ more sophisticated reasoning,
rather than mechanically applying forum law.
2.

Consider factors other than state interests

Another alternative, recommended by Professor H o r o ~ i t z , ~ ~ ~
is that the court enlarge the number of factors considered in
making the decision to include an analysis of applicable multistate policies and the relevant interests of the parties. The fact
that the court in the instant case indirectly considered the expectations of the defendant would lend some credence to this
s~ggestion.~~'
Professor Horowitz also points out that the opinions
in Reich, Bernkrant v. Fowler, and People v. One 1953 Ford
Victoria referred to one or both of these factors.lI2
It seems, however, that if the court is going to consider
factors other than the relevant state interests, it should do so
expressly, rather than relying indirectly upon these factors as
secondary support for a questionable decision supposedly based
solely upon state interest analysis. Even though it may make no
difference in the outcome whether the decision is expressly or
impliedly based upon other factors, it would seem that if the
court is going to base its decision upon something other than the
rule it is ostensibly applying, it should do so openly rather than
by attempting to distort the rule itself in order to reach the desired result.Il3
3. Adopt another method

An alternative method would be to completely abandon the
110. Horowitz' suggestions are discussed in the text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
111. The court referred to the imposition of civil liability as a "foreseeable and
coverable business expense." 16 Cal. 3d at 323, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221. In
light of the fact that the defendant advertised in California, it seems reasonable to assume
that the club could foresee the occurrence of an accident similar to the one that occurred
and the subsequent imposition of California law. This appears to be a more reasonable
basis for the decision than the state interest analysis.
112. Horowitz, supra note 57, at 772-79. These cases are discussed in text accompanying notes 73-82 supra.
113. This was a common criticism of the first Restatement. See text accompanying
notes 3-11 supm.
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emphasis upon an analysis of governmental interests and look to
other approaches, such as those discussed above. l4 Interestingly,
to the extent the court adopts Professor Horowitz' suggestion and
bases its decision upon factors other than state interests, the
governmental interest approach loses its distinctive characteristics and begins to closely resemble other conflicts of laws theories.
If the governmental interest approach includes, in addition to a
state interest analysis, a consideration of the multistate policies
and the relevant interests of the parties, it can scarcely be distinguished from Leflar's choice-influencing considerations discussed
above.l15 It might be said that the primary difference between
expanded governmental interest and the choice-influencing considerations is that in the former the state interest analysis predominates while in the latter there is no particular emphasis upon
any one factor and the court is free to base its decision upon the
element that it considers most relevant in the particular case.
The same resemblance can be drawn between expanded governmental interest and the broad approach permissible under section 6 of the Restatement (Second), 116 which includes as relevant
factors "the needs of the interstate and international systems,"
"the relevant policies of the forum," "the relevant policies of
other interested states," and "the protection of justified expectations." The broadened governmental interest approach is also
similar in some respects to Ehrenzweig's model. l7 Horowitz expressly mentions Ehrenzweig's "rule of validation" as one of the
applicable multistate policies to be considered,l18and the similarity between Ehrenzweig's "foreseeable and insurable law" theory
and Horowitz' "relevant interests of the parties" seems evident.l19
The governmental interest approach seems most foreign to
Cavers' principles of preference120 and the rules of the Restate114. The alternatives are discussed in the text accompanying notes 15-48 supra.
115. The choice-influencing considerations are discussed in the text accompanying
notes 22-33 supra.
116. The Restatement (Second) is discussed in the text accompanying notes 15-21
supra.
117. Ehrenzweig's approach is discussed in the text accompanying notes 37-48 supra.
118. Horowitz, supra note 57, at 759.
119. One of the elements of the factor entitled "relevant interests of the parties" is
called "prevention of unfair surprise." This element corresponds to Ehrenzweig's
"foreseeable and insurable law" maxim. Both phrases refer to the basic idea that no party
should be subjected to a law whose application he could not foresee. Compare Horowitz,
supra note 57 a t 776-79 with Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of
Laws-Toward a Theory of Enterprise Liability under "Foreseeableand Insurable Laws":
II, 69 YALEL.J. 794, 801 (1960).
120. The principles of preference are discussed in the text accompanying notes 34-36
supra.
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ment (Second). However, it may be that as more cases are decided utilizing governmental interest such rules and principles
may emerge. Horowitz himself states that "Professor Cavers' . . .
'principles of preference' will surely be the form which the choiceof-law rules of the future will take."1210f all the alternatives, the
instant case indicates that California is most likely to follow
Horowitz' suggestion-first attempting to resolve the conflict
through an analysis of the state interests and, if no decision can
be reached, going on to consider a limited number of additional
factors. However, an important point to be derived from the instant case is that perhaps the court should be more willing to
admit that the state interests are sometimes in balance. If a t that
point the court is going to broaden its analysis to include other
relevant factors, it should do so expressly rather than by implication.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the instant case that there are certain prerequisites to the successful application of the governmental interest
approach. First, it is imperative that the court be accurately informed as to the applicable laws. Second, the court must be thorough and honest in its attempt to ascertain the underlying state
interests; simply accepting a policy stated in a reported court
opinion is inadequate and leaves the court open to criticism.122
Finally, in the cases that present true conflicts, the court must
be objective and realistic in its attempt to sucresfully accommodate the conflicting state interests.
If the court's analysis meets the above criteria, governmental
interest will yield a satisfactory result in many cases. It seems
particularly useful in the false conflict cases such as Reich, and
can also be successfully employed in certain true conflict cases
such as People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria,123wherein the state
121. Horowitz, supra note 57, at 780 (footnote omitted).
122. Professor Leflar has commented upon this problem:
True governmental interests of a state are not discoverable by blind matching
with any old law that may be on the state's books. They can be identified, and
in turn implemented, only by thoughtful and intelligent analysis of the legal
materials in the light of current socio-economic, cultural, and political attitudes
in the community. Ascertainment of a state's governmental interests is no small
task, not one to be solved by locating a statutory section or a paragraph in an
old judicial opinion.
Leflar, supra note 22, a t 291.
123. 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
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interests can be accommodated by application of the comparative
impairment concept.
The instant case also brings into sharp focus the question of
how the court should react when no decision can be reached
through an analysis of the state interests. In these cases, the court
should look beyond the confines of state interest analysis for the
solution, preferably to include an analysis of additional factors
such as those recommended by Horowitz. In so doing, however,
the court should be willing to acknowledge that these factors are
being considered and should expressly identify them in the decision.

